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STUDENT NOTES
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Wis. 238, 177 N. W 14 (1920). It is undesirable that delivery of the
passbook or certificate of deposit be dispensed with here because in
the usual case the donor's lips have been silenced oy death before the
question comes before the courts and for this reason it is necessary to
scrutinize both the delivery and the intention of the donor carefully
in order to prevent dishonest practices. Yet this should not be carried
to the point of adding a long string of technical requirements to the
successful completion of a gift, particularly gifts causa mortis, as common experience has shown us that it is an ordinary human failing to
neglect provisions and transactions in anticipation of death until the
last hour makes unheeded apprehensions grow certain.
2. When the deposit is in the name of the donee, it is not essential
for a valid gift that there be- any delivery of the passbook if the
donee has knowledge of the gift and the donative intent of the donor
can be shown. This situation is less frequently found, but where it
has developed, the above rule seems to have been followed. McKiinnon
v. FirstNationalBank, 77 Fla. 777, 82 So. 743 (1919), Turner v. McManus, 38 R. I. 35, 94 Atl. 667 (1915), in addition to the two Kentucky
cases cited above have followed it. The difference in this situation and
the rule governing it from that in No. 1 is that the deposit in the name
of the donee serves as the delivery and no delivery of the passbook
or other evidence of ownership is necessary. However the mere fact
of deposit in the donee's name alone is not sufficient, but must be accompanied by knowledge on the part of the donee that the deposit was
made in his name. This is an important element, not only in completing the requirements of delivery, but perhaps also in justifying
such a case as Collins v. Collins' Aimr., supra, in which the donor
continued to exercise dominion over the funds after depositing them in
the donee's name; in which case it may be held that any dominion
which the donor exercised over the funds after the donee knows of
the deposit in his name, is illegal and of no effect, and therefore such
illegal exercise of dominion has no effect on the validity of the gift.
This was the reasoning of the court in the principal case. In all
gift cases the intention of the donor is an important consideration,
and if it can be clearly discovered, should, perhaps, be given more
'weight than any other element.
JOsEPH D. WEBB.
MuNcIPAL CORPOnATIONS-LIAsILITY

ON I

PLIED CONTRAcT.-G had

a contract to pump water from his mine into a city reservoir for which
the city promised to pay one hundred dollars per month. G decided to
cease operating the mine, so the city made a new contract to pay
twenty dollars a day if G would continue to furnish the water until
the city could make other arrangements. The contract was held to be
invalid. (Probably because not passed by city ordinance.) This was
the case of Gugenheim v. City' of Marion, 242 Ky 350, 46 S. W (2d)
478 (1932), in which the Kentucky Court of Appeals decided that G
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could not collect for the reasonable value of his service on. the theory
of implied contract.
The law is settled that a municipality or other public corporation
having general power to. contract with reference to, the subject mattel
of an express contract,, invalid for some irregularity in the execution.
thereof, is liable upon an implied contract for any benefit received
thereunder, when the form and manner of the letting or execution does
not violate any mandatory statutory restriction upon the power of
such corporation to contract, and it is not otherwise violative of public
policy. Kinsey v. Little River Co., Fed. Case No. 7829 (1876), Howell
Elee. L. & P v. Howell, 132 Mich. 117, 92 N. W 940 (1903), Wentickc v.
Passiac Co., 66 N. J. L. 65, 48 Atl. 609 (1901), Port Jervis Waterworks
Co. v. Port Jervs, 151 N. Y. 111, 45 N. E. 388 (1896).
But in general this doctrine applies only when the form and
manner of contracting, or the persons by whom and with whom contracts are to be made, are not prescribed by statute or charter, and
the right to contract is not limited to the form and manner therein
specified.
Referring to a state of facts falling within this rule, a California
court said in a leading case: "Under some circumstances a municipal
corporation may become liable by implication. The obligation to do
justice rests equally upon it as upon an individual. It cannot avail
itself of the property or labor of a party and screen itself from responsibility under a plea that it never passed an ordinance on the
subject. (No statute required an ordinance-Ed.) As against individuals the law implies a promise to pay in such cases, and the implication extends equally against corporations." San Francisco Gas
Co. v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. 453 (1858).
However the great majority of the cases fall without the classification above. The most of them are either, (a) ultra vires or, (b)
violative of some statutory limitation or requirement which is mandatory as to the manner of execution.
In a situation where the contract with a municipality is
(a)
strictly ultra vires there can be no implied contract. Hovey v. Wyandotte Co., 56 Kan. 577, 44 Pac. 17 (1896), such a; contract can not be
ratified. Cedar Raptds Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 117 Iowa 250, 90
N. W 746 (1902). Nor can a city be estopped from pleading ultra
Aires. State, ex rel. v. Minn. Transfer R. Co., 80 Minn. 108, 83 N. W
32 (1900).
(b) In a case where a city receives benefits under an express
contract violative of statutory restrictions (such as the requirement
that sealed bids be received), or where there was no contract and a
statute or charter required contracts to be made in a certain manner
(for instance by passing an ordinance), the great weight of authority
is that no implied liability can arise against the municipality. Moss
v. Sugar Ridge Tp., 161 Ind. 41, 68 N, . 460 (1903), Van. Buren L.
& P. v. Van Ruren,. 118 Me. 458, 109 AtL g (1920); 2Niland v, Brown,
193 N. Y. 180, 85 N. E. 1012 (1908), White v. Seaszde, 107 Ore. 330, 213:
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Blec. Co. v. Pasadena, 178 Fed. 425, 102 C. C.
A. 401 (1910), Richardson v. Grant Co., 27 Fed. 495 (1883), cases collected in 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1120.
At page 849, Vol. 3, McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, the
author states the rule thus: "
if a contract is within the corporate power of a municipality but the contract is entered into without observing certain mandatory legal requirements specifically regulating the mode in which it is to be exercised, there can be no recovery
thereunder. If the statute or charter says that certain contracts must be
let to the lowest bidder, or that they must be made by ordinance, or
that they must be in writing, or the like, there is a reason therefor
based on the idea of protecting the taxpayers and inhabitants, and
these provisions are mandatory, and while it is undoubtedly true that
mere irregularities in making the contract are not fatal to a recovery,
yet if the contract is entered into or executed in a different manner,
the mere fact that the municipality has received the benefits of the
contract which has been performed by the other party, does not make
the municipality liable, either on the theory of ratification, estoppel, or
implied contract, in order to do justice to the other party by paying
the reasonable value of the property or services."
,
Only Illinois and Minnesota are contra to this rule. Westbrook v.
Middlecliff, 99 Ill. App. 327 (1901), Fargo Foundry v. Calloway, 148
Minn. 273, 181 N. W 584 (1931). Early Kentucky decisions denying the
rule have been reversed. Worrefl Mfg. Co. v. Ashland, 159 Ky. 656,
167 S. W 922 (1914).
The argument made to support this line of decisions is that certain safeguards to taxpayers have been established by charter provisions and statutes, and the courts should not allow these to be
avoided by enforcing implied contracts. The -statutory requirements
are limitations on the right of municipal corporations to contract and
certainly they cannot be bound by an implied contract to accept a
responsibility which they could not assume by express contract. The
New York court in La France Fire Engine Co. v. Syracuse, 68 N. Y. S.
894 (1900), said, that to allow collection on an implied contract
S.
would open the door to that fraud and collusion which it
was the purpose of the legislature to prevent. It would be to say that
the mere persistence in wrong-doing renders legal what the law forbids." The California court states the reason for the rule in this language: "Nor is the corporation liable for the value of the work by
reason of any implied promise to pay, upon the idea that the city
derived a benefit from it. If so, as previously argued, it would dispense with the exercise of the power conferred on those in authority to
execute contracts, and the contractor, or the party performing the
work at the instance of any official of the corporation or even an inhabitant of the city, could make improvements beneficial to the corporation, and thereby create an implied contract on the part of the
city to pay. The difference between contracts of a private person and
those of an officer of a corporation is this; an individual. has the right-
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to make, alter, or ratify a contract at his own will and pleasure with
the consent of the party contracting with him, or if he stands by and
permits others to work for him, and accepts the work, the law implies
a promise to pay its value; while an officer of a corporation has no
power to make a contract except in the manner pointed out by the
statute from which the power is derived." Zottman, v. San Francisco,
20 Calif. 96 (1862).
This does not seem so harsh a rule against the party contracting
with a municipal corporation when it is remembered that such a party
is presumed to know the powers and limitations of the corporation to
make contracts. The loser knowingly took the risk. "Persons contracting with a municipal corporation must, at their peril, inquire into
the power of its officers to make contracts." City of Bowling Green
v. Gaines, 123 Ky. 562, 96 S. W 852 (1906).
New York makes exception to the rule in cases where there hag
been an attempt in good faith to carry out the requirements of the
statute. N. River Elec. L. & P Co. v. New York, 62 N. Y. S. 726 (1900).
Also when a contract is made in an emergency when it is not practicable to follow the statutory requirements. Sheehan v. New York, 75
N. Y. S. 802 (1902).
The only argument offered in support ol the minority line of decisions (represented by Westbrook v. Middlecliff and Fargo Foundry
v. Calloway, supra), is that it is not justice, where a contract is
entered into between a municipality and another, in good faith, and the
corporation has received the benefits, to permit the corporation to
retain the benefits without paying the reasonable value therefor, the
same as a private corporation or an individual would have to do. This
does not seem sufficiently, to answer the argument that a city having
a limited power to contract cannot be held liable beyond those limits.
Because of constitutional and statutory provisions in Kentucky
(Ky. Const., secs. 157, 162, 164, Ky. St 2741a-2, 2741m-1 and standard
city charter provisions), all cases in this state fall in classification
(b), and the principal case follows a long line of Kentucky decisions
which have consistently followed the majority rule stated above.
No cases have arisen in Kentucky analogous to the exceptional
cases decided in New York but in view of the uncompromising position
of the Kentucky court on the subject, it seems safe to predict that no
exceptions would be- made.
BRucE Mor oRFO.
JuRrsDIcTIoN'-Srus0ov UrImE.-A newspaper of recent date contained an account of a very peculiar murder. A, while standing in
West Virginia, shot across the border and killed B, who was standing
in Kentucky. A was brought to trial in West Virginia on a murder
charge, but was released because the court held that it did not have
jurisdiciton. to try the offense since the murder occurred in Kentucky.
This case raises an,interesting question, and an important one
also, since upon this decision may rest the safety of a number of in-

